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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

:
:

v.
STEVEN CORY HAWS

:

Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 200220181 -CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)(i)
(1953) whereby the Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1953) confers original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court over
appeals from the district court involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress Appellant's inculpatory

statements obtained during custodial interrogation because a law enforcement officer
gave him a defective "Miranda"warning in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Standard of Review: This issue involves a mixed question of
fact and law. The court on appeal reviews the trial courts'
factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress
for clear error, while conclusions of law are reviewed for
1

correctness. State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930,933 (Utah 1998) citing
State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1995).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR REVIEW
This issue was preserved for appeal by way of Appellant's filing his Motion to
Suppress Defendant's Statement and Memorandum in Support filed on April 19,2001 in the
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County before the Honorable Ann M. Boyden,
Judge. (R. 99-105) Said Motion cited inadequacies the law enforcement officer made in
giving Appellant his "Miranda" warning and argued that the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution and Miranda and its progeny, including both State and Federal case law,
demanded that Appellant's statements made thereafter be suppressed. (Id.) Appellant also
filed a Reply Memorandum to the State's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Suppress
on May 10,2001. (R. 116-122). Further, a hearing on Appellant's Motion to Suppress was
held May 18, 2001. (R. 402, 1-48) The trial court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
Law denying Defendant's Motion were filed May 30,2001 with the Third District Court in
and for Salt Lake County. (R. 128-131) Said Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law are
contained in Addendum A. At trial, defense counsel cross-examined the law enforcement
officer who claimed that he "Mirandized" Appellant meaningfully, despite objections by the
prosecutor that this was a legal issue which had already been decided by the trial court. (R.
405 at 199-205, 262)
II.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress Appellant's inculpatory statements

made during custodial interrogation because he did not voluntarily, knowingly and

1

intentionally waive his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
Standard of Review: This issue involves a mixed question of
fact and law. The court on appeal reviews the trial courts'
factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress
for clear error, while conclusions of law are reviewed for
correctness. State v. Galli. 967 P.2d930,933 (Utah 1998) citing
State v. Trover. 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1995).

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR REVIEW
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Appellant's filing of his Motion to
Suppress Defendant's Statement, Memorandum in Support and Request for Hearing filed
in the Third Judicial District Court on May 22, 2001. (R. 124-26) The Motion and
accompanying Memorandum asked the trial court to enter an Order suppressing
Appellant's alleged post-arrest statements and argued that the statements were not a
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his rights under both the Fifth and Sixth
amendments to the United States Constitution. (R. 124-126) The memorandum cited to
both state and federal case law in support of its argument. (Id.) A hearing on the matter
was held June 13, 2001 before the Honorable Ann M. Boyden, Judge. (R. 403, 1-65)
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law denying Appellant's Motion were filed July
31, 2001 in the Third District Court. (R. 173-177). Those Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law are contained in Addendum B. At trial, defense counsel again
conducted a meaningful cross-examination of the law enforcement officer regarding
Appellant's "waiver" of his Miranda rights. (R. 405 at 264-279)
2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES.
RULES AND REGULATIONS
The pertinent parts of the following constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances,
rules and regulations are contained in Addendum D.
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI, XIV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On September 11, 2000, Appellant was charged by Information with Clandestine
Lab, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or (b)
(1953). (R. 2) A co-defendant, Anthony Jackson, (hereinafter, "Jackson") was charged in
the same information with the same crime. (Id.) Jackson later accepted a plea bargain
from the State in which he pled guilty to a lesser included offense which was a second
degree felony. (R. 405 at 395) As part of the plea agreement, the State dropped a third
degree, Possession of a Controlled Substance charge which was filed against Jackson
after officers at the jail discovered methamphetamine on his person when he was booked
into jail for the clandestine lab offense. (Id.) Jackson testified on behalf of the State at
Appellant's trial. (R. 405 at 306-403).
At the preliminary hearing held April 10, 200, the trial court heard testimony from
Detective Nate Thompson who had been employed with the South Jordan Police
Department at the date of Defendant's arrest. (R. 401 at 6-20). Following the hearing, the
court bound the Defendant over as charged in the information. (R. 401 at 53-4)
3

On April 19, 2001, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statement
which included a Memorandum in Support of the motion. (R. 99-105) The motion sought
an order from the court suppressing Defendant's alleged statements arguing Detective
Thompson gave an incomplete and therefore invalid Miranda warning to the Defendant.
(Id.) The State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress on
May 7, 2001. (R. 109-15) Defendant then filed a Reply Memorandum to the State's
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Suppress on May 10, 2001. (R. 116- 22).
Finally, a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress was held May 18, 2001. (R. 402 at
1-48) Detective Thompson testified at the hearing (R. 402 at 4-31) The trial court's
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law denying Defendant's Motion were filed May
30, 2001. (R. 128-31) Revised Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were filed with
the court on June 19, 2001. (R. 158-61)
On May 22, 2001, Defendant filed a second Motion to Suppress Defendant's
Statement arguing that the statements should be suppressed because Defendant did not
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his Fifth Amendment rights. (R. 124-27)
The State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Suppress on June 13,
2001. (R. 134-42) The trial court held a hearing on the Motion on that same day, June 13,
2001. (R. 403 at 1-64) Detective Thompson testified at the hearing. (R. 403 at 12-46)
Following the hearing on the Motion, the State filed a Second Amended Information in
which it added "Iodine" in addition to psuedoephedrine and red phosphorus, as a
precursor chemical. (R. 144-45,403 at 62) Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
4

relating to the second motion to suppress were filed with the court on July 31, 2001. (R.
173-77)
Following a jury trial held December 12-17,2001 the jury convicted defendant of
Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37D-4 (1953). (R. 365) The jury also found the defendant guilty of each of the
three enhancements charged by the State. (R. 366)
On January 28, 2002, the trial court committed defendant to the Utah State Prison
for a period of not less than five years to life. (R. 388-89). The trial judge signed
defendant's Sentence, Judgment and Commitment on January 29, 2002. (Id.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime prior to August 19, 2000, the South Jordan Police Department received
complaints regarding traffic at a home located at 2868 West Quintail Circle. (R. 404 at
37) Detective Nate Thompson (hereinafter "Thompson") was assigned to conduct
surveillance on the home. (Id.) Prior to this date, Thompson's training regarding the
detection and investigation of criminal activity and clandestine laboratories in particular
included his attendance at a three-month training at Peace Officer Standards and Training
and his attendance at two different safety courses relating to clandestine laboratories. (R.
404 at 124-25. Thompson was not clan-lab certified on August 19, 2000 (R. 404 at 125)
Thompson conducted surveillance of the home at (R. 404 at 130), without the aid
of any other officers or detectives, on three occasions. (Id.) Thompson's surveillance
revealed that there was traffic at the home in the late hours of the evening and late hours
5

of the night. (Id.) In addition to his surveillance of the home, Thompson conducted traffic
stops on people leaving the home. (Id.) Thompson could not recall in his testimony what
specific traffic violations occurred which caused him to stop the cars leaving the home,
but that one of the reasons he stopped the cars was "just basically to see who was inside
the house. (R. 404 at 38; 130-31) Thompson also conducted a "trash run" of the home
where he went through the garbage belonging to the home. (R. 404 at 38) Thompson
found items in the garbage that led him to believe that someone inside the home may have
been cooking methamphetamine. (R. 404 at 38-9)
Thompson testified at trial that he had no information regarding Appellant at any
time prior to his arrest on August 19, 2000. (R. 404 at 132) During his surveillance of the
home, Thompson did not have any indication that Appellant was inside the home, nor did
he ever specifically see Appellant walking around inside of the house. (R. 404 at 131-32)
Appellant was not involved in any of the traffic stops of people leaving the home. (Id.)
No residency papers or bills or anything else uncovered in Thompson's trash run
conducted prior to August 19, 2000 indicated that Appellant lived in the home. (Id.)
Following his surveillance, Thompson requested a received a search warrant to be
served on the home. (R. 404 at 39) On August 19, 2000 Thompson, along with SWAT
teams from Sandy, West Jordan and South Jordan, executed the search warrant on the
home. (R. 404 at 40) Thompson waited inside a home across the street from 2868 West
Quintail Circle while the SWAT team members served the warrant. (R. 404 at 133)
Thompson waited one or two minutes following SWAT's entry into the home before
6

leaving the house across the street and joining the SWAT team in the home located at
2868 West Quintail Circle. (Id.) When Thompson entered the house, everyone inside the
house at the time the warrant was served was handcuffed and located in the rooms in
which they were found. (R. 404 at 134) Inside the house and handcuffed were the
following eight people: Anthony Jackson (hereinafter "Jackson"), Terri Emmons
(hereinafter "Emmons"), Jennifer Reynolds (hereinafter "Reynolds), Tina Tueller
(hereinafter "Tueller"), Appellant, Mark Steiner (hereinafter "Steiner"), Rick Hamby
(hereinafter "Hamby") and Matt Burr (hereinafter "Burr"). (R. 405 at 174-75)
Following his entry into the home, SWAT team members took him directly
upstairs to the room characterized as the master bedroom. (R. 404 at 49). SWAT
members then showed Thompson what they believed was iodine sitting on the sink in
what was characterized at the master bathroom. (Id.) Thompson observed Steiner,
Hamby and Appellant inside the master bedroom. (Id.) Thompson testified that Appellant
had been taken into custody and was handcuffed behind his back. (R. 404 at 50) Steiner
and Hamby were also handcuffed.(R. 404 at 134) Following the service of the warrant
and investigation of the home, Steiner was arrested for other drug charges that he had,
but he was not charged with any lab violations. (R. 405 at 178) Hamby was later released
from the home at 2868 West Quintail Circle and no criminal charges were filed against
him in relation to the service of this warrant. (R. 405 at 182)
After being shown the alleged iodine and observing the three handcuffed men in
the master bedroom, Thompson and SWAT team members took all of the arrested persons
7

to the kitchen/foyer/dining room area of the home. (R. 404 at 50-51) Thompson put
Appellant in the dining room area of the home. (R. 404 at 52) Thompson testified that he
then went "[b]ack up to the master bedroom to see exactly what we had in the kitchen,
and then I was directed downstairs to where the meth lab was found.(Id.) Thompson did
not search the master bedroom at this time. (Id.)
Upon going downstairs, Thompson observed people handcuffed in the basement
area. (R. 404 at 62) Thompson testified that the basement area was where the "actual
meth lab was" [found]. (Id.) Jackson was one of the persons found in the basement
bedroom which was later determined to belong to him. (R. 404 at 64)
At some point in time after leaving the basement area of the home, Thompson
asked another law enforcement officer, Sergeant Worlton (hereinafter "Worlton"), to
interview each one of the suspects and gather their names. (R. 404 at 68) Worlton
interviewed everyone except for Appellant. (R. 404 at 69) Instead, Thompson took
Appellant from where he had left him in the dining room area, and walked him up to the
master bedroom to interview him. (R. 404 at 70) Thompson wanted to take Appellant to a
location "kind of out of the way, [where] there wasn't people coming in and out of the
house. (Id.) Thompson conducted the interview by himself with no other officers or
suspects in the master bedroom. (R. 404 at 71) Appellant remained handcuffed, with his
arms restrained behind his back. (Id; R. 405 at 194) In an effort to make Appellant more
comfortable, Thompson took a cigarette from the TV stand, placed it in Appellant's
mouth, and lit it for him. (R. 403 at 26; R. 404 at 71-72; R. 405 at 194) Thompson
8

conducted his interview with Appellant holding the cigarette in his mouth throughout the
course of the interview. (R. 404 at 72) Thompson testified the he explained and/or
advised Appellant of his Miranda rights (R.401 at 13, 23-25; R. 402 at 21-24; R. 403 at
30; R. 404 at 74, 198-99). Thompson stated that during the course of this interview,
Appellant admitted to being the "chem guy," and that he was a "junkie" and needed meth
to survive. (R. 401 at 15; R. 402 at 13-14; R. 403 at 75 and 80; R. 405 at 266-67).
Thompson stated that Appellant also stated that he would take the "chems" to Tony
downstairs and later get meth. (R. 401 at 15-16) Following the interview, Appellant was
transported to jail. (R. 403 at 33-34). On September 18, 2000, the State of Utahfiledan
Information charging Appellant and Jackson with the Clandestine Lab offense as set forth
in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37D-4 (1953). (R. 2-4)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court should have suppressed Appellant's alleged statements and
excluded them from the State's evidence against Appellant at trial. Failure to suppress
Appellant's statements violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the United
States Constitution. Appellant was given a defective Miranda warning and did not waive
his rights under Miranda and its progeny.
Review of the facts and law associated with the suppression issues in this case
support afindingthat the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Appellant's alleged
statements at trial. The trial court's rulings prejudiced Appellant. Other than Appellant's
statements, the only other evidence the State had connecting Appellant with the crime
9
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suspect from the outset in that he was an admitted drug addict, an admitted liar, and his
testimony was subject to a plea bargain. Jackson's testimony was further shown to be
11n inlibk' wlirn hi , iuli i1 irslii'iMp »»" ihi'V' ^xjinii1 tfi*»i» v\\ i>l'p;ita( \ppclla««i
Realizing the Jackson was not going to incriminate Appellant, the State requested and
was granted a recess to go into the holding cell to talk with Jackson, Defense counsel
asked

noiding cell during the prosecutor's meeting with Jackson, but

the trial court denied this request When I;n ksnn in I lint Jimd Iiunrth lnll<m in Ins
meeting with the prosecutor, his testimony changed from exculpating Appellant to
directly incriminating Appellant.
i

iiements, there existed a real

probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different, since the Sl;il< In I i I
physical evidence tying Appellant to the crime.

ARGUMENT
L
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS OBTAINED
AFTER INTERROGATING OFFICER FAILED TO ADVISE HIM OF
ALL OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS REQUIRED IN
MIRANDA V. ARIZONA.1

The trial court violated Appellant's Fifth Amendment right against self-

'384

s i3(>, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)

incrimination and his Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution when it denied Appellant's Motion to Suppress Statements.
(Appellant's Motion to Suppress Statements is located in the Record at 99-106)
The United States Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.
1602,16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) that law enforcement officers must give certain warnings prior
to custodial interrogation of a suspect before the suspect's statement could be admitted in
evidence.
The circumstances in the case at bar demonstrate that Appellant was in custody at
the time of the interview for purposes of Miranda. Following service of the search
warrant, Appellant, along with everyone else found in the home, was in handcuffs. (R 404
at 134) During the interview, Appellant remained handcuffed, his arms restrained behind
his back. (Id; R. 405 at 194) Appellant and Thompson were alone in the master bedroom
of the home when the interview was conducted. (R. 404 at 71) Appellant was not free to
leave.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the custody issue in Salt Lake City v. Carner,
662 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983). The Court noted that custody is likely when police
questioning of a suspect shifts from merely that which is investigatory to that which is
accusatory. 662 P.2d at 1170. Thompson's questions posed to Appellant were clearly
accusatory. Thompson testified that he asked Appellant whether the iodine in the master
bathroom belonged to him. (R. 401 at 14; R. 405 at 266)
In Miranda, the Supreme Court outlined the warnings law enforcement must give
11

(In1 itiYiisnl prioi In i in ilii-ili.il iiili'iii^'iiliuii ,is follows:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning is he so
desires.
384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. At 1630, 10 L.Ed.2d at 726.
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Miranda v. Arizona in
Dickerson v. t ..-..

. .-

Defendant made a moti i

* <: • -

*

(2000). In Dickerson,
111.11 I in• 11 u I mi i il

received "Miranda warnings". The District Court granted the motion and the government
took an interlocutory appeal to the United States District Court for the 4 th Circuit Tha*
• *sd the Disti ict Coi n I: , detern tli ling that the Miranda deuM*-

^ .

constitutional holding. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, holding that
Miranda is a constitutional decision which could not be overruled by an Act of Congress,
.iiiiiil 11 mi I her lhal "Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of
statements made during custodial inlnio^alinn IIII liollli stiilr .mil InitT.il*imnls' 5'M) 11 S.
at 448, 120 S.Ct at 2328, 147 L.Ed.2d at 405.
One reiteration of the Miranda rights in the State of Utah is found in State v.
MI am

"7C> P 2d

V1

i m m i ni Ir'i'.v n in Sijani, ilu I Jiah Supn inc < nun tii'si i IIH'ILI Hit holding

in Miranda v. Arizona and wrote:
The Miranda warning originated out of the landmark United States
Supreme Court case of Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). That case outlined those basic rights of which the

accused must be adequately informed before any of his statements made to
law enforcement officers may be used against him.
779P.2dat223.
Defense counsel for Appellant filed his Motion to Suppress on April 19, 2001,
nine days after the preliminary hearing which took place April 10, 2001 (R. 99-106)
The memorandum included with the Motion argued that Thompson failed to warn
Appellant of all of the rights afforded to him under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution as mandated by the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The
Motion specifically argued that Thompson gave an incomplete warning to Appellant, in
that he failed to advise Appellant of his right to have an attorney provided at no cost, and
therefore the statements should be suppressed. (R. at ((-106)
Appellant's Motion relied on Thompson's testimony given at both the preliminary
hearing held on April 10, 2001(R. 401 at5-37) and at the hearing on his Motion to
Suppress held May 18, 2001(R. 402). The trial court denied Appellant's motion. (R. at
158-161)
Thompson's testimony elicited at the May 18, 2001 Suppression Hearing (R. 402
at 4-31) regarding the facts surrounding his interview of Appellant was markedly
different than his testimony given at the April 10, 2001 Preliminary Hearing (R. 401 at 537) Review of Thompson's testimony given at both proceedings as well as review of the
trial court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law suggest that in denying

13

Appellant
preliminary hearing and suppression motion testimony and therefore erred in both its
factual and legal conclusions.
" I 11 mi^ p r e ill ill in 11 ii mi i Iiii'iii iiiiiii11!11 ii'liir S l i i ' i r I I S I M M I T I I i i i | i i i u i

m i l m i I i "m 1111111.111 iiiiiii

whether he "Mirandized" Appellant. (R. 401 at 13). Thompson answered simply that "I
explained to him his rights." (Id.) When asked on direct whether Appellant waived his
rights, Thompson stated, "I le waived both of them." (id., emphasis added)
I )n cross-examination, Thompson mis t(iics(io»inl „ii«iuni n riii'din^ (lie Mnanda
rights he gave to Appellant prior to interviewing him. The text of that examination is as
follows:
Qi

11 i l IIIIIII
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start?
A:

I explained his rights to him as per Miranda.

Q: I see you're referring again to your report. I ask for purposes of cross-examination
that you not refer to that report unless you state on the record that you think it necessary
to do so. I would like just to ask you questions about your recollection right now, if you
would. Is that all right?
A;

Sure.

Q:

So you talked to him abou: KI, Miranda rights.

best of your recollection.
A:

Explained that he had a right to an attorney

Q:

All right

j

•

I

*ne what you told him, to the

it

Q:

All right.

A: If he didn't want to talk to me he didn't have to. If he wanted his attorney present,
before questioning, we wouldn't talk to him until his attorney was present. Explained that
anything he said would be used against him in court.
Q:

So how many rights did you explain to him, then?

A:

Two.

Q:

You consider what you have just explained to me right there as just two rights?

A:

Explained that he has the right to remain silent, right to an attorney.

Q:

So that's what you explained to him; just those two rights?

A:

Right to all the stuff I told you.

Q: So I'm a little unclear. Did you explain to him four rights? Or did you explain to
him two rights?
A:

I explained to him he had the right to remain silent and he had a right to an attorney.

Q:

Those are the two things you explained to him?

A:

That's correct.

Q:

Nothing else?

A:

I explained t h a t . . .

MS. BEATON: Well Judge, I mean I think what Mr. Shapiro is not understanding is the
officer considers those to be two rights, and then he goes further and explains if you
choose to talk to us that can be used against you.
THE COURT: This is cross-examination and Mr. Shapiro is entitled to try to pin him
down any way he can. I'm not sure what your objection is.
MS. BEATON: Well, I guess it's argumentative.
MR. SHAPIRO: Judge, I'll back up and start again.
15

THE COURT: Well, let's not start aga»;. . — asked him what he said to the defendant.
He told you what he said, and you asked him how many rights that was. He said there
were two rights, identified what those two right are. Go from there.
(BY Mxv. ^nAPIRO;

e

'!»u not to spe^ ^ you?
i Y:

Correct. Right to remain silent.

ri

And the other one was?

*

(R. 401 at 23-25)
Review of Thompson's above testimony given at the preliminary hearing
demonstrates that I hompson s warning to Appellant did not meet the constitutional

In order to fully apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights
under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has a
right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will
be appointed to represent him. Without this additional warning, the
admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood
as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the
funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if
not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent - the person most
often subjected to interrogation- the knowledge that he too has a right to
have counsel present.
3841 1 S ; it 4 73, 86 S C t \ it 1627, 161 Ed 2< 169 1 (1966)
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Strain agreed and said "that if police propose
to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and
111 il il hi i annul affut! uin , •• t,n\ , u w ill he provide. . ; nim prior to any interrogation."

i o

779 P.2d at 224 (1989).
The record cited supra demonstrates that Thompson failed to advise Appellant that
if he could not afford an attorney, one would be provided to him at no cost. This is true
despite the ample amount of opportunity Thompson was given to testify as that he did, in
fact, advise Appellant of that right. Defense counsel repeatedly asked Thompson to
explain what rights he gave to Appellant prior to the interview. (R. 401 at 23-25) In
response, Thompson repeatedly stated that he only advised Appellant of his right to
remain silent and his right to have an attorney present. (Id.) Thompson never testified at
the preliminary hearing that he advised Appellant of his right to have an attorney
appointed for him at no cost, even upon re-direct examination by the State. (R. 401 at 3536) The holding set forth in Miranda and Strain is not satisfied unless all elements of
the Miranda warning are given to the accused. Failure to provide even one element is
nonetheless a failure for constitutional purposes. 384 U.S.at 473, 86 S.Ct. at 1627,16
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); 779 P.2d at 224 (Utah 1989)
There is no reason to disbelieve Thompson's testimony given at the preliminary
hearing regarding what rights he advised Appellant of prior to interrogating him.
Thompson himself vouched for the credibility of his testimony that he had given at the
preliminary hearing: testifying as follows on cross-examination by defense counsel at the
suppression hearing on May 18, 2001:
Q: When you left the preliminary hearing after it was held, did you believe that you
had testified truthfully and accurately?
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i did.
\};

Did you believe that you'd left anything out?

A:

No.

Q:

1 hil ' mi III11 in i II", illi.il! "i i •' * I mi in in. ni I'!" t i n * ' I ni in ni s i 1,1 k r s ?

v-.

402 at 26-27)
In contrast to his testimony given at the preliminary hearing, review of

best, suspect, and at worst, coached or manufactured for purposes of answering
Appellant's Motion to Suppress.
accuracy and truthfulness of his preliminary hearing testimony,
Thompson testified i

suppression hearin

preliminary hearing testimony.

v

*
He testified that his error was his failure

7

to advise Appellant that an attorney would be appointed to represent him "free of charge."
hi | 'I Mniiiji«Mtfi t'vplanuul lli;'i 'I ' V M ' " '

I

i

pic'ini'iuis IIIVII iim> (esliiiioin OLC HI u.'ii

because he was "nervous" and "interrupted"when he testified on April 10, 2001. (R. 402
at 15 and 24)(See also Addendum C)
e suppression hearing that he only became aware
of his ""error" during a telephone conversation with the prosecutor wherein she < ii h I si ; " i
him that he had left one part of the Miranda warning out of his testimony. (R. 402 at 25)
He testified that this conversation with the prosecutor took place a "few days" after the
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preliminary hearing. (Id.)(See also Addendum C)
The trial court should have viewed Thompson's claim of "nervousness" with great
caution. That testimony is incongruent with the rest of Thompson's testimony given at
the suppression hearing and at trial, and there is no support in the preliminary hearing
record which would support the claim of "nervousness". Instead, the weight of the
evidence demonstrates that Thompson did not give Appellant a full and complete
Miranda warning.
Thompson testified that he had from seven to eight and a half years of experience
as a police officer. (R. 401 at 6; R. 402 at 4-5, 19; R. 403 at 13; R. 404 at 33-36; R. 405 at
164-72) He also testified that during that time, he had interrogated suspects and given the
Miranda warnings on over one hundred occasions. (R. 402 at 19, R. 405 at 263) Although
Thompson agreed that the Miranda warning is a "little bit long.", (R. 405 at 197), he
testified repeatedly that he had never given an incomplete Miranda warning. (R. 402 at
19; R. 405 at 263) Further, Thompson repeatedly testified that he could not remember
what Appellant actually said to "waive" his rights under Miranda, but that it would have
been a verbal response. (R. 401 at 132; R. 403 at 30-313 R. 404 at 74-754)
2

When asked by the State at the preliminary hearing what words Appellant used to waive
his Miranda rights, Thompson answered: "I don't recall exactly what he said, but he would have
had to have said yes or I would not have continued talking to him."
3

The State asked Thompson how Appellant responded "when he asked him, did he
understand those rights ..." Thompson answered, "Verbally." When asked what words
Appellant used to waive his rights, Thompson stated, "I don't recall." (R. 403 at 30-31) The
State then asked Thompson why he did not include in his written report what Appellant's "actual
comment was to you when he waived those rights?" Thompson testified, "At the time I probably
19

Apparently Thompson' r.v Election of events w;is lirlln • Ilini In " k
other details. While Thompson testified that he remembered walking Appellant up the
stairs to the master bedroom (R 402 \ it 11; R • !()4 at 70, R 405 at 191), leaving the door

room at Appellant's request, placing it into his mouth, and lighting it (R. 404 at 71-72; R.
405 at 194-95)
llu'u: i'. .MI .ill1 >( I mi i in1 ILII Ik I Il MI (»(ii nil iii 11 it* pri'linmiarv hearing transcript that
T h o m p s o n w a s " n e r v o u s " while testifying and simply forge
Appellant that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be provided for him at no
cost, Thompson never indicated to the trial court that he w a s nervous. T h e record does
liiiil i v l l i v l (diil In1 riitfatu'tl in ans miiimn

tun < li.ii;utriislir nl m n, n-usni;-is Theh' i m>

indication that Thompson asked for a drink of water. There is no indication that
Thompson asked for a break in his testimony. Thompson makes no statement at all which
M l I III ||| II11111 i M Ml" i l l III III

II

lit I

IIIII ,

There also exists n o indication in the preliminary hearinr

•^

I'hompsnn

felt that he had been interrupted and therefore unable to recite the complete admonition he
had gi \ en Appellant on August

l regarding his rights, w h i l e Thompson had

every occasion available to him throughou
( :

. .iii v\dc\i\ vhat he said to me, just that he did waive his rights." (R. 403 at 32)
4

The State asked Thompson twice at trial whether he remembered the specific or exact
words Appellant used to "waive" his Miranda rights. Thompson's answers to both questions
were, "I don't."
20

misstatements he had made either on direct, cross-examination, and re-direct, he never did
so. Nor did Thompson ever indicated to the court that he was interrupted, and unable to
complete his testimony as it related to his Miranda warnings given to Appellant on
August 19, 2000. Thompson never requested that he be able to add to his testimony if he
thought he had left anything out. He had every opportunity to correct the record, had he
thought he was leaving anything out, on direct, cross-examination, and re-direct.
Thompson never did this. Review of his preliminary hearing testimony reveals that his
testimony was credible on April 10, 2001.
Review of Thompson's testimony elicited at the suppression hearing on May 18,
2001, however, supports a finding that his testimony regarding his "error" was suggested
to him by the State. (See Addendum C)
The trial court's ruling that the "Defendant was properly admonished of all of his
Miranda rights," (R. 160) seems to be based on its 9th finding of fact which reads as
follows:
The Court finds that Det. Thompson's recitation of the Miranda warnings as
[sic] the suppression hearing was the format used on August 19, 2000 when
Defendant was interviewed. When Det. Thompson was asked to reiterate
the warning, it flowed naturally. It was clear that he had the rights
committed to memory. His preliminary hearing testimony was in summary
form by using phrases such as "I explained."
(R. 159)
That Finding of Fact suggests that the trial court blatantly ignored the credibility of
Thompson's testimony given at the preliminary hearing, thereby giving full consideration
to Thompson's nonsensical suppression motion testimony. Further, the trial court's query
21

should have been focused on what rights Thompson advised Appellant on on August 19,
2000. It is irrelevant that Thompson was able to reiterate the warning on May 18, 2000,
and that it "flowed naturally" on that date. It is also irrelevant that Thompson had the
Miranda rights committed to memory on May 18, 2001. His preliminary hearing
testimony clearly demonstrates that he did not have those rights committed to memory on
August 19, 2000. Thompson's other testimony given on May 18, 2000, supports a
finding that his testimony was coached, and one can infer from that testimony contained
in Addendum C that Thompson probably practiced reciting the Miranda warning prior to
testifying.
Review of the facts and law associated with the suppression issues in this case
support a finding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Appellant's alleged
statements at trial. The trial court's rulings prejudiced Appellant. Other than Appellant's
statements, the only other evidence the State had connecting Appellant with the crime
charged was testimony of the co-defendant, Anthony Jackson. Jackson's testimony was
suspect from the outset in that he was an admitted drug addict, an admitted liar, and his
testimony was subject to a plea bargain. Jackson's testimony was further shown to be
incredible when his initial testimony on direct examination exculpated Appellant.
Realizing the Jackson was not going to incriminate Appellant, the State requested and
was granted a recess to go into the holding cell to talk with Jackson. Defense counsel
asked to be present in the holding cell during the prosecutor's meeting with Jackson, but
the trial court denied this request. When Jackson took the stand directly following his
22

meeting with the prosecutor, his testimony changed from exculpating Appellant to
directly incriminating Appellant.
Had the trial court excluded Appellant's alleged statements, there existed a
substantial probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different, since the
State lacked physical evidence tying Appellant to the crime.
Review of the facts and law associated with the suppression issues in this case
support a finding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Appellant's alleged
statements at trial. The trial court's rulings prejudiced Appellant. Other than Appellant's
statements, the only other evidence the State had connecting Appellant with the crime
charged was testimony of the co-defendant, Anthony Jackson. Jackson's testimony was
suspect from the outset in that he was an admitted drug addict, an admitted liar, and his
testimony was subject to a plea bargain. (R. 405 at 384, 390, 394) Jackson's testimony
was further shown to be incredible when his initial testimony on direct examination
exculpated Appellant. Realizing the Jackson was not going to incriminate Appellant, the
State requested and was granted a recess to go into the holding cell to talk with Jackson.
Defense counsel asked to be present in the holding cell during the prosecutor's meeting
with Jackson, but the trial court denied this request. When Jackson took the stand directly
following his meeting with the prosecutor, his testimony changed from exculpating
Appellant to directly incriminating Appellant.
But for the admission of defendant's statements, the outcome of the trial may have
been different because the jury certainly could have found that the iodine in the bathroom
23

could have belonged to Steiner, Hamby, or anyone else in the house. There was no
evidence presented that Appellant had full and exclusive control over the master bedroom
or the entire house, for that matter. There was no evidence presented of fingerprints tying
Appellant to the iodine. There was no evidence presented to demonstrate that Appellant
had ever had anything to do with the iodine, other than his own statements and those
made by Jackson at trial.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING APPELLANT'S ALLEGED
STATEMENTS BECAUSE THEY WERE OBTAINED WITHOUT A KNOWING.
INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER,

The trial court denied Appellant's second motion to suppress his statements
following a hearing held on the matter June 13, 2001. (R. 403; 173-76) Appellant based
the second motion on the grounds that Appellant's alleged waiver of his Miranda rights
was not a product of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision.
Denial of Appellant's second suppression motion violated his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights - those rights which guaranteed him that he would not be compelled to
incriminate himself and that he would be awarded all of his Due Process rights made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Appellant suffered prejudice when the trial court denied his motion to suppress and
allowed his alleged, incriminating statements to be used against him at trial. See
Argument on Point I: supra.
Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and its
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progeny require that a valid waiver of Miranda rights be knowing, intelligent and
voluntary.384 U.S. at 492, 86 S.Ct. at 1637.
The voluntariness of a confession is determined by considering the totality of the
circumstances in which it was made. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 266,
(1973), State v. Rettenberger. 984 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1999).
The circumstances in the case at bar surrounding the alleged Miranda
admonishment and waiver are suspect for the argument set forth supra regarding the
credibility of Thompson's testimony.
When describing the facts and circumstances surrounding Appellant's alleged
waiver of his rights, Thompson testified that at the time of the interview, Appellant did
not appear to be nodding off or sleeping, did not have any visible injuries or complain of
any injuries, did not appear to be under the influence of a controlled substance, and did
not smell an odor of methamphetamine on the Appellant or in the master bedroom. (R.
403 at 20 -29)
The trial court should have viewed this testimony with great caution, as it is
completely incompatible with the other circumstances of the case. An inference can be
made from the record, again, that this particular testimony was the product of coaching by
the State in preparation for the Appellant's second motion to suppress hearing.
Thompson never testified at the preliminary hearing regarding his observations of the
mental and physical condition of Appellant at the time of the interview. Further,
Thompson's insistence that Appellant was not under the influence of anything is totally
25

inconsistent with his testimony explaining that he was investigating a home where there
was a lot of late night traffic, indicating drug trafficking; that everyone in the house was
awake at 4:21 a.m. when the warrant was served; that he suspected there would be a
methamphetamine lab at the house (R. 401 at 7); and that there were indications of drug
use throughout the master bedroom and the entire home (R. 401 at 9-12).
Further, it is laughable and almost inconceivable that Thompson remembers every
minor detail of the circumstances surrounding Appellant's alleged "waiver", yet from day
one, he cannot remember what words Appellant actually used in waiving his rights. See
footnotes 2,3, & 4, supra. The more likely scenario supported by the record, is that
Appellant was smoking at the time of the alleged waiver, and said nothing to indicate that
he waived his Miranda rights. Moreover, any alleged waiver, had it been made by
Appellant, could not meet the "knowing and intelligent" burden of Miranda and its
progeny, because it is clear from the preliminary hearing testimony that Thompson gave
Appellant an incomplete warning.
As argued supra, Thompson's testimony at the suppression hearings was not
credible. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to weigh the evidence and in
denying Appellant's motions, finding instead that the State had met its burden.
Appellant's conviction at trial was a direct result of the admission of his alleged
statements.
CONCLUSION
The trial court committed reversible error when it denied Appellant's pre-trial motions
26

regarding the admissibility of statements taken in violation of Appellant's Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to the United States Constitution as identified in Miranda
v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and its long progeny of both
State and Federal case law.
The trial court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law regarding both
Appellant's Motions to Suppress constitute an abuse of discretion. Review of the record
supports both factual findings and legal conclusions which in turn, support suppression of
Appellant's alleged statements. Law enforcement failed to warn Appellant of all of his
Miranda rights and Appellant did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive those
rights.
Appellant respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court's rulings denying
his Motions to Suppress Statements.
DATED this ^ ^

day of September, 2002
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
!

REVISED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(DEFENDANT'S FIRST MOTION)

Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 001916037 FS
STEVEN HAWS,
Judge ANN BOYDEN
Defendant.

This Court denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court has reviewed the briefs
submitted, heard testimony and considered the legal arguments by counsel. The Court does not
believe there was a Miranda violation. The Court makes the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On August 19, 2000, Det. Nathan Thompson ("Det. Thompson"), formerly of the South
Jordan Police Department, went to 2868 Quintail Circle in South Jordan, Utah to participate in
the execution of a search warrant.
2. Det. Thompson requested Defendant come with him upstairs. Defendant was handcuffed at
the time.

3. Det. Thompson took Defendant into the master bedroom.
4. The two stood in the room while Det. Thompson, from memory, advised Defendant of his
rights. Det. Thompson said, "You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will
be used against you in a court of law. You have arightto an attorney. If you cannot afford to
hire an attorney, one will be appointed to represent you. If you decide to answer questions
without having an attorney present, you can stop answering questions at any time and you can
also ask for an attorney at any time."
5. Det. Thompson was not interrupted by Defendant during the course of the admonishment.
6. Det. Thompson asked if Defendant understood his rights and if he would be willing to talk to
him. Defendant answered in the affirmative to each question.
7. Det. Thompson then proceeded to interview Defendant. The Defendant made incriminating
statements.
8. On April 10, 2001, a preliminary hearing was held before Judge Anthony B. Quinn. During
examination, Det. Thompson failed to mention the "appointed counsel" provision of the Miranda
warning.
9. The Court finds that Det. Thompson's recitation of the Miranda warings as the suppression
hearing w^the format used on August 19, 2000 when Defendant was interviewed. When Det.
Thompson was asked to reiterate the warning, it flowed naturally. It was clear that he had the
rights committed to memory. His preliminary hearing testimony was in summary form by using
phrases such as "I explained."

i i

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Defendant was properly admonished of all of his Miranda rights.
2. The law does not require an officer to read from a pre-printed card when advising a suspect of
his or her Miranda rights.
3. The preliminary hearing is not the appropriate setting to flesh out suppression issues.
4. The State met its burden to show that Defendant was properly Mirandized on April 19,2000.
DATED this

day of June, 2001.

JUDGE ANN BOYDEN
Third Judicial District Court

Prepared by:

&>/(iUt
NDA J. BEAT
Assistant Attorney Genbral

Approved as to Form:

STEVEN G. SHAPIRO
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion was mailed, postage
pre-paid, to:
STEVEN G. SHAPIRO, (#6330)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
Attorney for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

13$day of June, 2001.

DATED this T

BRENDA J. BEATON, UBN 6832
Assistant Attorney General
MARK SHURTLEFF, UBN 4666
Utah Attorney General
DEA Metro Narcotics Task Force
348 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(DEFENDANT'S SECOND
MOTION)

Plaintiff,
V
V.

Case No. 001916037 FS
STEVEN HAWS,
Judge ANN M. BOYDEN
Defendant.

This Court denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court has reviewed the
briefs submitted, heard testimony and considered the legal arguments by counsel. The Court
believes that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The Court
makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On August 19, 2000, at 4:21 a.m., Detective Nathan Thompson ("Det. Thompson"),

formerly of the South Jordan Police Department, went to 2868 Quintail Circle in South
Jordan, Utah ("the residence"), to participate in the execution of a search warrant.

1A

2.

Defendant and another man were found in the master bedroom of the residence.

Neither of the two men appeared to have been sleeping.
3.

Defendant was brought to the front room of the residence and was handcuffed and

seated on the couch.
4.

Other than during the initial entry, a gun was never drawn on Defendant.

5.

Det. Thompson was not wearing a uniform or a gun.

6.

During the entire time the officers were at the home, Defendant did not appear sleepy

or injured. Defendant did not complain about being tired or injured in any way. He had no
visible signs of injury.
7.

Approximately one hour to an hour and a half after entry into the home, Det.

Thompson led Defendant upstairs to the master bedroom of the residence to conduct an
interview.
8.

In order to make Defendant more comfortable, Det. Thompson allowed Defendant to

smoke during the course of the interview.
9.

Det. Thompson and Defendant both stood in the room while Det. Thompson, from

memory, admonished Defendant of his Miranda rights.
10.

Neither Det. Thompson nor Defendant was interrupted or distracted during the course

of the admonishment or the subsequent interview.
11.

Defendant looked at Det. Thompson during the course of the admonishment and the

subsequent interview and appeared to be concentrating on what Det. Thompson was saying.

12.

Defendant spoke to Det. Thompson in English and had no difficulty understanding

the questions Det. Thompson was asking him.
13.

Defendant did not appear to be under the influence of any controlled substances

during the course of the admonishment or the subsequent interview. Det. Thompson did not
notice any signs or smells associated with the smoking or ingesting of methamphetamine or
any other type of drug or alcohol.
14.

The master bedroom door remained open during the course of the admonishment and

subsequent interview.
15.

Det. Thompson asked Defendant if he understood his rights and if he would be

willing to talk to him. Defendant answered in the affirmative to each question.
16.

Defendant never made any effort to invoke hisrightsduring the course of the

interview.
17.

Det. Thompson proceeded to interview Defendant. Defendant made incriminating

statements. He was only interviewed one time.
18.

The interview with Defendant took approximately ten minutes.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Given the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's Miranda waiver was made

knowingly and intentionally.
2.

Defendant was not impaired in any way that would affect his ability to properly waive

his Miranda rights.
3.

Defendant was not coerced, threatened or intimidated into waiving his Miranda

rights.

DATED this g / s i day of i 3 # 2 0 0 1 .

JUDGE ANN M. BOYDEN
Third Judicial District Court
Prepared by:
BKENDA J. BEATON
Assistant Attorneyfeeneral

Approved as to form:

JANET MILLER
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the forgoing motion was mailed,
postage prepaid, to:
JANET MILLER
Attorney for Defendant
10 West Broadway, Ste. 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
DATED thiOV

day of July, 2001.

D'&NTELA N' JON*
Legal Secretary

Q.

Now, as Ms. Beaton was asking for your explanation of

why it was that your preliminary hearing testimony didn't
include all of the elements that you just described to us this
morning, your explanation was, in part, that you were
interrupted; is that correct?
A.

That's correct.
MR. SHAPIRO:
THE COURT:

Judge, can I approach?
Uh-huh, you may.

MR. SHAPIRO:

Showing you a transcript of the

Preliminary Hearing held in this matter, I'm pointing you
to —

specifically to Page 23 of that transcript, and I'm

asking you to take a look at Lines 13 through 23.
read over those for me?
A.

13 through what?

Q.

23.

A,

13 through 23.

I am sorry.

Would you

Q.

You talked to him about his Miranda rights.

If you'd

just read over to yourself.
A.

Oh, I'm sorry.
THE COURT:

What page?

MR. SHAPIRO:

23.

Does the Court have the whole copy

of the transcript?
THE COURT:
Defendant's memo.

I may have.

It is accompanying the

I have pages up to 55, it looks like, that

are completed.
MR. SHAPIRO:
A.

You have read over those, now, Officer?

I will in just a second, please.
Okay.

Q.

All right.

Now, is your —

is it your recollection

that that's the way you testified during the preliminary
hearing?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So you are not suggesting that there's anything

inaccurate about the way the preliminary hearing transcript
reads; are you?
A.

No.

Q.

That was your testimony?

A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

And starting then with Line 13, you'll

see that I asked you a question which was to recount to the
Court what you told the Defendant to the best of your
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter

recollection; is that correct?
A.

Thatf s correct.

Q.

And your responses to that was what?

A.

According to the transcript?

Q.

Unless you remember it better off the top of your

head.
A.

Just explained to him, according to the transcript,

he had the right to an attorney.
Q.

All right.

Now, at that time, did I interrupt you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

"All right."

Q.

Did you consider that to be an interruption which

And what did I say?

threw you off your train of thought?
A.

It was an interruption, yes.

Q.

Did that make it so that you were then thinking

unclearly?
A.

Not one specific thing, no.

Q.

All right.

A.

"Had a" —

Q.

And you believe then that I interrupted you again?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you are saying that by my interrupting you by

Then what's the next thing that happened?
that he had the right to remain silent.

saying the word "all right," that that was something that
interrupted your concentration?
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter

A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

A.

"If he didn?t want to talk to me, he didn't have to.

And then what happened?

If he wanted his attorney present, before questioning, we
wouldn' t talk to him until the attorney was present.,f
Explained that anything that was said would be used against
him in court.
Q.

Do you believe that I interrupted you at the end of

that statement that you made?
A.

Said, MSo how many rights did you explain to him,

then?"
Q.

Is it your belief, Officer, that you didn't have a

chance to fully answer the question that you were answering?
A.

Did you interrupt that statement?

No.

Q.

Exactly.

A.

No.

Q.

I didn't interrupt you there?

A.

No.

Q.

You don' t feel that I cut you off in the middle of a

phrase?
A.

No.

Q.

You had the opportunity to say everything that was an

answer to that question?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you p e r c e i v e my q u e s t i o n t o you on Line 13 as

Carlton Way, R e g i s t e r e d P r o f e s s i o n a l Reporter

being —

tell me some of what you explained to the Defendant.

Is that what the question was that you thought I was asking?
A.

No.

Q,

You thought I was asking you to tell everything that

you explained; right?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And you did explain everything that you explained to

the Defendant?
A.

I explained everything that day, yes.

I explained

—

I explained what I explained in the transcript, yes.
Q.

Like you explained —

like you testified earlier to

Ms . Beaton, you very nervous.
A.

I was very nervous?

Q.

Were you very nervous?

A.

Very nervous.

Q.

And you weren't nervous this morning?

A.

No, not as nervous.

Q.

Why is that?

A.

I couldn't tell you.

Q.

Now, let's talk for a second about the conversations

which you have had with Ms. Beaton.

When did it come to your

attention that your testimony there did not include all of the
necessary components of the Miranda warning?

When did you

become aware of that?
A.

What date specifically?
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Q-

Yep.

A.

I don't recall what date.

Q.

How did you become aware of it?

A.

I was advised by Ms. Beaton.

Q.

That your testimony was inaccurate?

A.

That I had left one part of Miranda out, that I left

part of the Miranda out.
Q.

So she told you, "Hey, look, you screwed this up."

That's how you became aware of it?
A.

She told me that I left part of the Miranda out.

Q.

Tell me about that conversation.

Approximately how

long after the preliminary hearing did you have that
conversation with Ms. Beaton?
A.

I couldn't tell you.

Q.

Approximately how long ago?

A.

It was over the phone.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Few days after the hearing, I suppose.

Q.

And what exactly did she tell you?

A.

That I'd left that —

About how long ago?

file a motion to suppress.

that you guys were going to

And I asked what the issue was,

and she explained it to me.
Q.

How did she explain it to you?

A.

That my testimony —

Q.

All right.

I left part of the Miranda out.

And what did you tell her in response to
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that?
A.

That I was nervous and that I was interrupted.

Q.

You told her that?

A,

I told her —

no, I am sorry.

I told her that I was

nervous.
Q,

Did she tell you that you were interrupted?

A.

No.

Q,

Did she suggest to you that as an explanation?

A,

No.

Q.

At any point?

A.

No.

Q.

How many conversations have you had with her about

your testimony in the preliminary hearing?
A.

This one today before the hearing, and then just

right after that last hearing.
Q.

So several times?

A.

Twice.

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
4# [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

